Consider a horizontally differentiated duopoly market where potential buyers are uncertain about their matches with either product. Would informative advertising by a firm about its own product disclose any information about the other product when firms know how their as well as their rival's product matches buyers' preferences? I answer this question in the context of a television (TV) market that lasts for two periods in which viewers are uncertain about the attributes of the upcoming programs. A symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in which advertising decisions of the TV stations depend on the attributes of both programs exists, and is the only such strategic equilibrium. Although not fully revealing, it enables viewers to narrow down their priors. When this PBE is unattainable, the only other equilibrium is one in which the advertising decision of a station is independent of the other program's attributes. While it is welfare improving to ban such advertising if the latter PBE arises as the market outcome, this is not necessarily true for the former one. This raises an obvious empirical question: Do TV stations act strategically while advertising their own programs?
Introduction
There is a broad range of consumer markets where the differentiation among products is mainly in their physical attributes. Although the information about the existence of these products may be common knowledge, many people may have limited or even no information about their attributes. This lack of information may be due to the fact that the products are newly introduced, or that the costs associated with gaining information are relatively high. Television (TV) industry is a good example. It is almost impossible for people to know the attributes of all of the programs at different TV stations. Gaining accurate information through TV guides or internet is often costly. fully informed about the attributes of these programs, there would be no need for tune-ins. Çelik (2006) takes a look at the extent to which a single TV station is willing to air a tunein. The model is developed in a simple Hotelling framework in which there is a continuum of potential viewers distinguished by their ideal programs. This is represented by assigning a unique location to each potential viewer along the unit line. As usual in Hotelling models, a viewer's net utility is lower the further away the actual program is from her ideal program.
There is a single TV station that airs two consecutive programs. The location of the first program is assumed to be common knowledge. This may be thought of as the evening news program. The location of the second program is ex-ante unknown by viewers. However, the viewers know that the TV station is privately informed about its location. Therefore, they rationally anticipate that the TV station would communicate this piece of information with the first-period audience unless it is worse off by doing so. The cost of airing a tune-in is the forgone revenue from a commercial advertisement during the first program. In this setting, it is shown that there exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in which the TV station airs a tune-in as long as the advertising revenue generated by the viewers continuing to watch offsets or exceeds the cost of airing it. In the absence of a tune-in, no one from among the first-period audience keeps watching TV.
In order to extend the analysis above to include a second station, one has to introduce the possibility of switching from one station to the other. In fact, Çelik (2006) introduces as an extension the possibility of switching off after sampling a few minutes of a program.
While a PBE similar to the one described above remains to exist, it is no longer unique.
For certain parameter values, there exists another PBE in which the TV station never airs a tune-in. In this paper, I move one step further by incorporating viewers' switching behavior into the same setup when there are two TV stations. I assume that the amount of time required for learning the actual location of a program is fixed and the same for all programs and individuals. However, this process entails an opportunity cost if an individual does not continue to watch the program she chose to sample.
The process of costly sampling plays a crucial role for two reasons. First, for an equilibrium that involves the use of tune-ins to exist, sampling cost (or equally switching cost) has to be positive. Had it been zero, viewers could costlessly learn the programs at both stations and make their decisions without any uncertainty. Therefore, there would be no need for tune-ins. Second, a positive sampling cost may create an incentive for a station to choose not to air a tune-in. This is because the cost of sampling becomes sunk once a viewer chooses to engage in sampling. That is, when there is costly sampling, some individuals may end up watching a program that they would not choose to watch with complete information. By the same token, an individual's final decision may not be the one that maximizes her utility with complete information. That a positive sampling cost is necessary for the existence of tune-ins is empirically confirmed by the statistics given earlier. It is harder to establish empirical support for the second one because of limited individual-level data. However, Shachar and Emerson (2000) report that 65% of viewers continue to watch the same network station, including the times when a tune-in has not been aired.
When the TV stations are informed about each other's program content, their decision to air a tune-in may transmit information about not only their own program but also their rival's. Since sampling is costly, a station is relatively more inclined to air a tune-in in order to lock-in its current viewers when its rival has a more similar program. However, this may signal to the recipients of that tune-in that the program at the other station is more likely to be a good match than what they thought before. Similarly, if a station does not advertise its upcoming program, it does not necessarily mean that it is a bad match for that station's viewers. It could rather be the case that it is a better match than the other program. In this paper, I am primarily interested in exploring the nature of such strategic behavior, and ultimately in finding out if an equilibrium in which viewers' priors are changed at an interim stage exists. I show that such an equilibrium exists although it is not unique. Without any restriction on viewers' beliefs, there is another equilibrium in which viewers' beliefs about either program are unchanged regardless of the tune-in decisions of the stations.
Signaling has traditionally been investigated within the context of vertically differentiated products. When consumers are uninformed about the actual quality of an experience good, it has been shown that a high-quality seller can credibly signal this information by setting a high price or by spending a non-trivial amount of money on uninformative advertising.
My findings suggest that signaling is also possible in horizontally differentiated markets.
Signaling occurs whether a station chooses to or not to air a tune-in. In the former case, only information about the other program is signalled. In the latter, information about both programs is signalled. However, a fully separating equilibrium is not possible in the current setting; viewers cannot locate the programs with certainty.
For certain program locations, the model can also be interpreted as one with vertical differentiation. To be more specific, when a station's upcoming program is better suited to all of its current viewers than the other station's upcoming program, the two programs are effectively vertically differentiated for those viewers. In such a situation, I find that the former station does not air a tune-in. Although this result is strikingly different than what traditional models of signaling predict, a direct comparison may be misleading since TV programs are not experience goods. Neverthless, it is interesting to note that signaling is possible even in the absence of advertising.
I also analyze the welfare effects of a possible ban on the use of tune-ins. I find that when it is not a credible strategy for a station to behave strategically, it may be welfare improving to ban tune-ins. In such a situation, the stations advertise their programs more often.
Although viewers enjoy a higher surplus as a result of improved information, social welfare is reduced because the decrease in revenues of the TV stations overweights the increase in consumer surplus.
Previous Literature
Directly informative advertising has been the topic of several previous studies. Butters (1977) was the first to model the informative role of advertising. In his paper, products are homogeneous and advertising conveys information about prices, hence also about the existence of the products indirectly. However, much advertising involves informing consumers about product attributes other than just about prices. Grossman and Shapiro (1984) study an extended model in which consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences and advertising informs them not only about the existence but also about the characteristics of the products.
Common to both of these papers is that the advertising technology is exogenous and people cannot change their likelihood of receiving an ad.
The current paper has several similarities with the latter of the mentioned papers; consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences and seek to purchase the product yielding the highest (expected) benefit, products are horizontally differentiated, and advertising provides information about product attributes. I assume that it is free to watch TV, and that the number of total non-program breaks is given exogenously. Therefore, my analysis does not involve price advertising. However, I depart from Grossman and Shapiro (1984) in several ways, mainly in how advertising is modeled. Advertising in this paper is exclusive; only the viewers who watch the first program may receive a tune-in of the second program at that station. It is also strategic in the sense that a station's decision to air or not to air a tune-in conveys information about the programs at both stations.
Confining attention to the literature that focuses on informative advertising in an oligopoly market with horizontally differentiated products, a related paper is Meurer and Stahl (1994) .
They analyze the welfare properties of informative advertising in a duopoly where a fraction of buyers are uninformed about the product characteristics. There are two types of buyers. One type is ideally matched with one firm and the other type is ideally matched with the other firm. As in Butters (1977) , Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and many others, a firm chooses its advertising intensity and a random fraction of consumers receive the ad.
Advertising informs a buyer of her best match. Firms choose their prices after advertising takes place. They treat product information as a public good, which implies that information about one product provides information about the others as well. They characterize a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which the level of advertising provided may be more or less than socially optimal. While advertising improves the match between consumers and products, it gives firms a higher market power by increasing brand loyalty.
Within the same strand of literature, another related paper is Anand and Shachar (2006) .
They use the same setup with that of Meurer and Stahl (1994) with three major differences.
First, a firm can only advertise through one or both of the two available media channels, and consumer preferences over product attributes are perfectly correlated with their choice of media channel. So, for instance, if consumers of media channel 1 are ideally matched with product 1, then firm 1 can target these consumers by advertising through media channel 1.
Second, advertising messages are noisy in the sense that consumers may get the wrong idea from a firm's informative ad. Therefore, firms advertise more than once. Finally, firms do not choose prices, which are therefore suppressed in the analysis. In such a setting, Anand and Shachar (2006) characterize a separating equilibrium in which a firm advertises only to those consumers for whom that product is the ideal one. As long as the ads are not completely noisy -in which case the ads would equally be interpreted right or wrong -there exists a threshold amount of advertising which ascertains a consumer that the advertised product is her best match. Thus, regardless of the content of the ad, each consumer purchases the product that she was advertised to.
There are major differences between my model and those of Meurer and Stahl (1994) and Anand and Shachar (2006) . First, in both of these papers, products are experience goods, so consumers do not have the option of obtaining product information by a costly search. In the current paper, I treat TV programs as search goods since program sampling is a common practice in real life. If I rather treated them as experience goods, the unique symmetric equilibrium would involve no strategic behaving by the stations. Therefore, sampling plays a crucial role for the results in this paper. Second, there are only two distinct types of consumers in both papers, one ideally matched with one product and the other with the other product. In Meurer and Stahl (1994) , this assumption implies that an informative ad by one firm necessarily informs the recipient about the other firm's product, and therefore plays a critical role for their results. In Anand and Shachar (2006) , it is a necessary assumption for perfect separation. In my model, on the other side, there is a continuum of people who may or may not be ideally matched with either program. Therefore, the tune-in decision of a station is a function of the program location of the other station. Third, advertising in my model is purely informative unlike as in Anand and Shachar (2006) , and reaches a nonrandom group of consumers unlike as in Meurer and Stahl (1994) . In this sense, I use a different advertising technology in the current paper.
The current paper is also weakly related to the literature on quality signaling. To the best of my knowledge, the only two papers that address quality signaling when firms have common knowledge of product qualities are Matthews & Fertig (1990) and de Bijl (1997) . In Matthews & Fertig (1990) , this is introduced in the context of an incumbent-entrant setup where product quality of the entrant is known to both firms while that of the incumbent is common knowledge. Prices are exogenous and the incumbent may advertise in order to inform consumers about the product quality of the entrant; i.e. may counteract misleading attempts by a low-quality entrant. In sharp contrast to the existing models of quality signaling, they show that a high-quality entrant can successfully signal its quality by spending an infinitesimal amount on advertising. De Bijl (1997) analyzes entry-deterrence in a market for search goods when product quality of the entrant is known to both firms while that of the incumbent is already established. It is shown that when the incumbent's price is informative about the product quality of the entrant, entry of a high-quality entrant is facilitated. 1 
The Model
The basic setup is that of Çelik (2006) with the exception that there are now two TV stations, station Y and station Z, each airing two programs in two consecutive time periods.
The programs are characterized by their locations on the unit line. They are of the same length and have zero production costs. There are A available non-program breaks during each program in each period. 2 There is a large number of firms that are willing to pay up 1 See also Hertzendorf & Overgaard (2002) who analyze signaling with price-only when firms have common knowledge about product qualities. 2 The assumption that the number of non-program breaks is fixed is certainly restrictive. However, while U.S. broadcasters are free to choose the number of their commercial breaks, advertising ceilings are imposed on broadcasters in most European countries. Therefore, in most cases, especially in the prime time, the number of commercial breaks that maximize a broadcaster's revenues falls below the imposed ceiling. I believe that this empirical fact constitutes a good justification. Aside from the empirical side, there are technical reasons for this assumption. First, if TV stations were allowed to choose the number of non-program breaks, then people would rationally form priors about it. Second, and most importantly, to $p per viewer reached for placing an advertisement during a program in each period.
On the other side of the market, there is a continuum of N potential viewers who are uniformly distributed on the unit line with respect to their ideal program types. To each possible program type on the unit line, there corresponds a viewer for whom that program is the ideal one. Individuals have the same program preferences during both periods. An individual derives v units of utility from watching her ideal program that carries A nonprogram breaks. 3 Formally, a viewer who is located at a distance of d units from a program obtains a net viewing benefit v − d. Not watching TV yields zero benefits. 4 The parameter λ will be used to represent the location of an individual, and a particular individual will be referred to as "she" when it is convenient.
The locations of the first programs is assumed to be common knowledge. the number of non-program breaks in the first period would provide information about the second-period programs. 3 The base utility, v, also captures the effects of the disutility associated with interruptions during a program. Specifically, the effect of an increase (a decrease) in the nuisance cost of a non-program break on a viewer's utility can be captured by lowering (raising) the base utility. 4 We can as well include a constant, t, in front of d that measures the disutility associated with one unit of distance from the ideal program type. However, since the value of not watching TV is zero, we can easily express the utility as r − d, where r = v t . 5 They would never air more than one tune-in because tune-ins are assumed to be fully informative, and viewers do not switch stations in the first period.
Viewers have the option of switching to the other station or simply turning the TV off after sampling a few minutes of a program. I assume that the amount of time required for learning the true location of a program is fixed and same for both programs and for all individuals. This sampling process entails a cost of c, and is referred to as the "sampling cost". A viewer incurs one unit of the sampling cost if she samples the programs at both stations and ends up watching the one that yields a higher utility. If an individual decides the turn her TV off after sampling one of the programs, then her net utility is −c. If she does so after sampling both programs, then her net utility is −2c. Since the locations of the first programs are known beforehand, viewers do not engage in sampling in the first period.
However, sampling one or both of the stations may be optimal in the second period. An individual's objective is to make a decision at each time that maximizes her total utility. I maintain the following three assumptions throughout the analysis. , respectively, and this is common knowledge.
The first and the second assumptions are made in order to rule out unreasonable equilibria. This shall be more clear as the analysis proceeds. Note that it imposes an upper bound on the value of the sampling cost, and a lower bound on the number of non-program breaks. To be more specific, it is implied that 0 < c < 1 8 and A > 6. The third assumption is made in order to simplify the analysis. Combined with the first assumption, it implies that viewers on the lower half of the unit line watch station Y and the ones on the upper half watch station Z.
The timing of the moves is as follows. First, people make their first period viewing decisions. Then the first program starts, and the TV stations make their tune-in decisions during the first program. Having watched the first program, people update their beliefs about the second programs depending on whether or not they were exposed to a tune-in.
The second programs start and people make their optimal sampling decisions. After each individual completes sampling one or both (or none) of the stations, they make their final second period viewing choices and the payoffs are realized.
Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept used is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). That is, the TV stations make optimal tune-in decisions taking the location of their rival's program and the rationality of people into account, and people make optimal sampling and viewing decisions after observing the tune-in decision of the station they have watched. In particular, people's inferences (or posterior beliefs) after the first period about the locations of the second programs must be correct, and the TV stations should not have any incentive to deviate.
As discussed in the Introduction, the TV stations may choose to behave strategically due − v − c,
which is always true by Assumption (1).
We also need to check if engaging in sampling is optimal at all for this person. Expected utility of doing so is
¤ , where the second term is due to the fact that it is also optimal to sample the other station when the first program sampled is not at 0. If this is nonnegative, then it is optimal to engage in sampling for viewers with
Rearranging, expected utility becomes . So, when y = , it is optimal to also sample Z for the viewers with locations
. Finally, suppose it turns out that y = 1. The expected utility of switching to Z is
which equals
¢ . This is greater than −c when 2v − c > 1 2 , which is again true by Assumption (1).
The analysis above equally applies to other possibilities as well. So, as a general rule, stopping sampling is optimal when the location of the program first sampled is at most at a distance 
v+c 2 Table 1a . Audience share of station Y in the "no tune-in" PBE
v + c y = 
, where the first term is the utility she would enjoy at Z when z = 0, the second term is the utility she would enjoy at Z when z = , switch to Z. The ones who switch to Z will stay there once they discover that z = ¢ , 
¢
The unique Nash equilibrium in this game is (β Y , β Z ) = (1, 1) provided that
This is true by Assumption (1) and thus the stations face a Prisoners' Dilemma situation.
That is why a "no tune-in" regime cannot be maintained in an equilibrium.
Lemma 2 By Assumptions (1) and (2), it must be true that
Note that when (y, z) = ¡ 0,
is in general more restrictive compared to
. Together with Assumption (1), Ac ≥ 1
. However, as each viewer will watch the first station they choose to sample. Both stations are actually worse off compared to the "no tune-in" regime. However, it is in fact optimal for station Y to switch back to the "no tune-in" regime if Z is going to air a tune when (y, z)
viewer who is initially indifferent between the two stations continues to stay at Y after not seeing a tune-in, she will infer (incorrectly) that z is either 1 2 or 1 upon seeing that y = 0.
+ c, it is worth checking out station Z, too. But when she discovers that z is also 0, she will one more time be indifferent between the two stations provided that λ ≤ v + c.
Similarly, if she starts at Z and sees that z = 0, she will infer that y is either stay with Y , the others switch to Z.
Those who switch to Z will have the sampling cost sunk, and therefore
will stay with Z when z = . If z turns out 0, then all of them stay with Z.
Case (3): Y does not air a tune-in.
The inference of viewers in this case is that Y did not air a tune-in because either y = 1 or z = 1 (or both). There are five possibilities:
¾ So the posterior probability that y = 0 is same with the probability that z = 0, which is 1 5 .
Similarly, Pr
, and Pr (y = 1) = Pr (z = 1) = 3 5 . This means that viewers are indifferent between the two stations, and a random half will choose Z first. For those who stayed with Y , the actual location of y will determine their further behavior.
If y = 0, they infer that z = 1. So viewers with locations less than v + c stay with Y , and the rest switch off. Note that for v < λ ≤ v + c switching off yields a disutility of c, so it is better to stay tuned.
, they infer that z = 1. So viewers with locations
stay with Y , and the rest switch off.
If y = 1, they infer that z ∈ © 0, − (v + c), the expected utility of sampling is
This is at least as great as −c if 2v
≥ c, which is true by Assumption (1). Since
¤ is decreasing in λ, all of these viewers would choose to sample Z.
Viewers with locations
would stay with Z unless z = 1. So, their expected utility is,
This expression is greater than or equal to −c when 2v − 
, it is,
We need this value to be nonnegative for a viewer to sample Y . For 0 ≤ λ <
(2c). This is negative if λ is greater than 3c − v. If
− (v + c) is less than (or equal to) 3c − v, then all of these people engage in sampling.
. By Assumption (1), we must have , and decreasing thereafter), we can conclude that sampling is desirable conditional on β Y = 0.
We are now ready to calculate the audience share of a station. The table below : Y airs a tune-in unless y or z is 1, Z airs a tune-in unless y or z is 0.
, people have no reason to expect the strategies in Proposition (1) to times the audience share in the first period (which is 1 2 ). So, the ex-ante expected per-viewer profits of station Y can be expressed as (the superscript S stands for strategic),
What happens when v + c + Table 4 . The value of β Y (y, z) in two alternative regimes When Y does not air a tune-in, all of its viewers will switch to Z since it is highly likely that y = 1. If z turns out 0 or 1 2 , then they are certain that y = 1, and none of them come back to Y . When it turns out that z = 1, however, viewers will get confused. Station Y might have played the first or the second strategy. If it played the first strategy, y could be Since there is also the chance that z = 1, only the viewers with λ > This case is symmetric with Case (1).
Case (3): Y does not air a tune-in.
In this case, it is inferred that y = 1, and therefore none of the current viewers of Y will watch it.
Calculating the audience share of station Y for all possible program locations gives, Table 5 . Audience share of station Y in the non-strategic PBE Note that deviation is not possible in this case, since none of Y 's current viewers would keep watching or would come back later when β Y = 0. So, the unique symmetric PBE when
is the one in which the two stations play non-strategically.
, the unique symmetric PBE is the one in which Y airs a tune-in unless y = 1, and Z airs a tune-in unless z = 0.
Arguing along the same lines as before, the ex-ante expected per-viewer profits of a station can be expressed as (the superscript NS stands for non-strategic),
is on average more profitable to behave strategically, the existence of profitable deviations induces the TV stations to behave non-strategically.
, even an infinitesimally small value of the sampling cost gives rise to the non-strategic equilibrium.
, both equilibria can be supported as PBEs. However, as long as viewers rationally expect the TV stations to play the less costly strategies, the non-strategic equilibrium can be ruled out. To be more precise, provided that v + c +
, it is always optimal to play strategically for the TV stations when the viewers expect them to do so.
However, if the viewers are pessimistic in the sense that they only expect the worse when they do not see a tune-in, the unique PBE is the non-strategic one.
Social Value of Tune-ins
In this section, I analyze the effects of a possible ban on the use of tune-ins. I compare the expected social welfare under a hypothetical "no tune-in" regime with that under no restrictions. In the Appendix, I find the expected utility of a random viewer in all of the possible three situations: the strategic equilibrium (S), the non-strategic equilibrium (NS), and a "no tune-in" equilibrium (NT).
In a regime of no tune-ins, ex-ante expected per-viewer profit of a station in the second period is just the average of the audience shares given in Table 1 , multiplied with the number of commercials and the per-viewer price. So, the total ex-ante expected per-viewer profits of a station are given by,
Let W denote the social welfare which is defined as the summation of station profits and viewer well-being. Then, the change in expected social welfare when the non-strategic PBE arises is expressed as,
for all parameter values. This means that it is welfare improving to ban the use of tune-ins
, since non-strategic equilibrium is the unique symmetric PBE for these parameter values. Although viewers are obviously better off when there are tune-ins, it may be the case that lost revenues are too high, and therefore it is better to ban tune-ins. The primary reason for why the stations lose that much revenue is that fewer people watch TV when there are more tune-ins in general. In the absence of a ban, the "no tune-in" regime is not sustainable as an equilibrium because of unilateral deviations.
The same result does not carry over to the strategic equilibrium. The reason is that the expected audience size in the strategic equilibrium is equal with that in the "no tune-
i p, the change in expected social welfare when the strategic PBE is the outcome is,
which is negative when p > by market forces to air too many tune-ins. This is due to two factors. First, an equilibrium with no tune-ins is not feasible because of the oligopoly structure; without tune-ins, more people would switch away. Second, strategic equilibrium is not credible when c and/or and perfectly anticipate these incentives beforehand. As a result, the stations are forced to air more tune-ins. The higher the number of tune-ins, the better choices people make, which implies a smaller audience size in the second period. So, the stations are double jeopardized when the strategic equilibrium cannot be attained; a higher number of tune-ins and fewer viewers on average. The revenue they lose in such a situation is larger than the increase in the well-being of viewers. Therefore, banning tune-ins is welfare enhancing.
The latter one of the two factors above is also present in the strategic equilibrium. However, since c or
is small enough, strategic equilibrium is credible. Therefore, the second factor does not arise. When the strategic equilibrium is attainable, stations do not end up airing too many tune-ins. Consumer surplus is now lower since viewers more often get stuck watching a program that is a bad match. When the per-viewer commercial price is low relative to the sampling cost, the decrease in the well-being of viewers is smaller than the increase in the revenues of the TV station due to fewer tune-ins, and therefore no intervention is necessary. However, it is also implied that the baseline utility is not very large so that all of the viewers do not watch the second program until the end. I believe that these assumptions are in line with empirical regularities and do not impose restrictions on the findings.
Existence of two symmetric PBEs has been shown. In the first one -referred to as the strategic PBE in the text -each station's tune-in decision depends on the location of its own as well as the location of its rival's program. A station chooses not to air a tune-in whenever at least one of the programs is such that no first-period viewers of that station would watch it. Not airing a tune-in when a station's own program is not appealing to its first-period viewers is optimal because a tune-in would not bring in any viewers. Similarly, it is not optimal to air a tune-in when a station knows that its first-period viewers will not like the program at the other station, and therefore anyone who may initially switch to the other station will come back.
The second possible PBE -referred to as the non-strategic PBE in the text -is the one in which each station's tune-in decision only depends on the location of its own program. A station chooses not to air a tune-in only when its program is such that none of its first-period viewers would watch it. This PBE is shown to exist as long as Assumption (1) is satisfied, and to be the unique equilibrium when either the sampling cost is relatively high or the TV stations have a small number of non-program breaks (or both). In the opposite case, both equilibria are valid. It is at first ambigous as to which one of these equilibria would be 
Appendix
In this appendix, I find the utility of a random viewer under three specifications; the strategic PBE (S), the non-strategic PBE (NS), and the "no tune-in" regime (NT). I assume that the viewer located at Integrating over λ, we get:
Case (2): (y, z) = ¡ 0, + v + c < λ ≤ 1
